Posted on November 28, 2025
New maritime services ban threatens to sever lifeline for Yamal LNG exports
By Paul Morgan (gCaptain) – In the frozen waters above the Arctic Circle, a fleet of specialised ships has for years quietly sustained one of Russia’s most valuable energy assets, but these are not ordinary tankers. Built to smash through sea ice up to two meters thick, the Arc7 ice-class carriers represent the cutting edge of Arctic maritime technology, and now they’re at the centre of a sanctions battle that could reshape global energy flows.
On November 12, the UK government announced it would ban British companies from providing any maritime services to vessels carrying Russian liquefied natural gas. The decision, unveiled by Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper at a G7 meeting in Canada, extends far beyond a simple import restriction. It targets the entire ecosystem of shipping, insurance, and maintenance that makes Russian LNG exports possible.
For one company in particular, the announcement landed like a depth charge. Seapeak Maritime (Glasgow) Ltd., a UK-registered arm of the broader Seapeak group, controls six of the fifteen specialised carriers that serve Russia’s Yamal LNG project on the Arctic coast. Last year alone, those six ships are reported to have transported 7.56 million tonnes of liquified gas from the frozen north, worth almost $4 Billion and generating enough tax revenue for Moscow to purchase 2,700 attack drones or 45 ballistic missiles.
Now, under the new regulations being phased in throughout 2026, all of that comes to an end. A UK government spokesperson confirmed explicitly to industry observers that Seapeak is included within the scope of the sanctions with no exceptions. The company will no longer be permitted to provide shipping, insurance, or any other maritime-related services for Russian LNG cargoes once the ban takes full effect.
Critically, UK officials emphasised that the measure contains no carve-outs for Arctic operations or ice-class vessels. Despite their specialised capabilities and the extreme operating conditions they have to overcome, icebreaking LNG carriers are treated identically to conventional tankers if they transport Russian-origin cargo while relying on UK-linked services. This unambiguous stance places enormous operational pressure on Seapeak’s Glasgow-linked fleet, which has historically depended on UK-based management, insurance, and technical support for its highly specialized Arctic operations.
“This is about choking off the revenue streams that fund Putin’s war machine,” a UK government spokesperson told industry observers. “And it’s about doing so in coordination with our European partners.”
The UK already banned direct imports of Russian LNG back in January 2023, but that measure only stopped gas coming into British ports. Russian exports to Asia and other markets continued flowing freely, often facilitated by London-based insurers and service providers who dominate global maritime trade. This new ban closes that loophole entirely.
What makes the policy particularly consequential is its focus on Arctic operations. The Yamal LNG facility, located on Russia’s remote Yamal Peninsula, depends absolutely on its fleet of ice-breaking carriers. During winter months, when temperatures plunge to minus 50 degrees Celsius and the Kara Sea freezes solid, only specially designed Arc7 tankers can navigate the route.
These vessels are engineering marvels—double-hulled, with reinforced bows and powerful propulsion systems that allow them to operate year-round in conditions that would trap conventional ships. South Korea’s Daewoo Shipbuilding built them specifically for the Yamal project under long-term charter agreements running through 2045.
But here’s the catch: four of Seapeak’s six Arctic carriers are insured through UK-based protection and indemnity mutuals like Charles Taylor & Co. Without that insurance coverage, the ships cannot legally operate in international waters. Finding alternative underwriters willing to cover such specialised, high-value vessels engaged in sanctioned trade will be extraordinarily difficult and expensive.
The UK government confirmed to maritime analysts that the ban applies unequivocally to all British companies, there are no exemptions for Arctic operations or existing contracts.
For Russia, the entire Yamal operation depends on fifteen ice-class carriers, and all fifteen are currently insured by companies in nations that comply with G7 sanctions. Seapeak’s vessels alone account for 40 percent of Yamal’s total export capacity. Losing access to that fleet would slash the project’s ability to deliver gas to global markets.
Russia has attempted to build its way out of the problem. The Zvezda shipyard in the Russian Far East was supposed to produce domestically-built replacement carriers, but the project has been crippled by sanctions. French membrane technology specialist GTT, whose systems are essential for storing super-cooled LNG, ceased all activities in Russia. South Korean shipyards cancelled contracts to build fifteen Arc7 carriers for Russia’s next-generation Arctic LNG 2 project.
The result has been a procurement disaster. In recent years, Zvezda has delivered just a single vessel for Arctic operations—nowhere near enough to offset potential Western withdrawals.
Moscow has tried to assemble a “shadow fleet” of conventional LNG tankers to maintain exports, but these vessels lack ice-breaking capability. They can only operate during the brief summer navigation season between June and November, when the Northern Sea Route becomes passable. Recent incidents show shadow fleet vessels struggling even with early winter ice formation, raising serious concerns about safety and environmental risk in one of the world’s most fragile ecosystems.
The stakes extend beyond Russia’s balance sheet. Last year, Yamal LNG supplied approximately 20 percent of all liquefied natural gas imported by European nations—some 16.6 million tonnes in total. While the European Union has already decided to ban Russian gas imports starting January 2027, with short-term contracts phased out even earlier in mid-2026, the disruption will still ripple through energy markets.
Asian buyers, particularly China, have absorbed increasing volumes of Russian Arctic LNG as European demand decreases. During the most recent navigation season, Russia managed to export close to three million tonnes to Asia via Arctic routes. But maintaining year-round flows without proper ice-class carriers and Western insurance remains a fundamental challenge.
Industry analysts suggest Seapeak might attempt to sell or transfer its Arctic vessels to third-party operators in non-sanctioned jurisdictions. But given the long-term charter agreements with Yamal running through at least 2045, finding buyers willing to navigate the legal and financial risks would be extremely difficult. Any potential purchaser would need to secure alternative insurance, financing, and maintenance arrangements—all while operating vessels that have become toxic assets in Western-aligned markets.
The broader message is unmistakable. For three years, Western sanctions on Russian energy focused primarily on oil exports, with mechanisms like price caps designed to restrict revenues while maintaining supply. LNG received comparatively lighter treatment, partly because European nations remained dependent on Russian gas even after the invasion of Ukraine.
That calculation has now changed. The UK’s maritime services ban represents a fundamental escalation—one that strikes directly at the specialised infrastructure enabling Russia’s Arctic energy ambitions. London’s dominance in global marine insurance and shipping services gives the policy real teeth. When British P&I clubs withdraw coverage, alternatives are limited and expensive.
For operators in the harsh waters above the Arctic Circle, the implications are stark. The next 12 to 18 months will determine whether alternative arrangements can sustain operations or whether the region’s LNG supply chain faces fundamental collapse. Either outcome will reshape energy flows, alter market dynamics, and test Russia’s ability to maintain its position as a major global gas exporter.
As one maritime insurance executive put it, speaking on condition of anonymity: “You can build ships in China or Russia. You can find buyers in Asia. But you can’t easily replace the trust and infrastructure of the London marine insurance market. That’s what makes this so consequential.”
The ice-breakers will keep sailing for now, at least through the transition period in 2026. But their long-term future—and with it, a significant portion of Russia’s energy export capability—has become deeply uncertain. In the geopolitics of energy sanctions, sometimes the most effective pressure points are not the resources themselves, but the invisible web of services that makes their sale possible.
