Posted on December 8, 2025
America’s ports are a backbone of the U.S. economy and national defense. They move food, fuel, medical supplies, and military logistics at scale. But modern port operations increasingly depend on networked industrial systems, especially ship-to-shore (STS) cranes, where the line between “equipment” and “information technology” has largely disappeared.
A central concern is the dominance of Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industries (ZPMC), a People’s Republic of China (PRC) state-owned enterprise (SOE), which controls around 80% of STS cranes operating at U.S. ports. Market dominance at this level is not just a commercial reality; it hardwires a structural supply chain and transport sector dependency on the PRC, creating a national security risk that can be rapidly exploited in a geopolitical crisis.
Image source: DefCon
What are the threats to U.S. maritime security when using foreign-owned and operated technology?
Cybersecurity risks
Foreign-manufactured equipment can introduce vulnerabilities through unauthorized modifications and installations, such as cellular modems added to cranes, creating backdoor pathways that can be exploited for espionage or sabotage. These risks are compounded by recurring weaknesses in maritime operational technology (OT) environments: end-of-life operating systems that are unpatched, weak password policies, and broad use of privileged accounts. In critical infrastructure, such conditions turn routine connectivity into an attack surface.
Supply chain vulnerabilities
Reliance on foreign-manufactured equipment becomes a strategic risk when one supplier dominates. If ZPMC controls most of the crane market, it can exert leverage through parts, service, and technical support. Even a limited disruption could slow throughput and ripple across multiple ports—without a single “shutdown” event. U.S. maritime resilience depends on the continuity of these systems, especially under geopolitical stress.
Economic influence and procurement pressure
ZPMC’s competitive pricing, linked in part to cheap labor and subsidized inputs, creates powerful incentives for ports to choose lower-cost options. But the lowest bid can mask long-term security costs. Over time, repeated procurement decisions trade strategic resilience for near-term savings, embedding foreign-controlled technology into critical nodes of the U.S. supply chain.
Foreign intelligence threats
Port cranes are not passive machines. They can see, record, and transmit valuable operational data about what is moving, where, and when – information that can be uniquely sensitive when it overlaps with defense-related logistics or critical industries. A compromise could grant malicious cyber actors insight into cargo flows, shipping patterns, and port operations, and potentially enable manipulation or disruption.
National security concerns with PRC SOEs
Chinese SOEs such as ZPMC have strategic ties to the PRC state, and senior leadership structures may include Chinese Communist Party membership. The concern is not merely technical; it is governance and alignment. When the supplier is state-influenced, the U.S. must assume a different risk profile around access, coercion, and exploitation – especially when contracts lack strong cybersecurity provisions, audit rights, and enforceable penalties for unauthorized modifications.
Example: OCR as a national security and intelligence risk
Modern cranes increasingly use Optical Character Recognition (OCR) to read markings on shipping containers, improving automation and inventory accuracy. In many implementations, images captured by crane cameras can be sent to third-party vendors for processing, with text results then returned to systems on the crane. Where that processing occurs, locally or externally, matters. If imagery and metadata routinely leave the port environment without strong governance and visibility, ports may be exporting operational intelligence without fully recognizing it.
What is the immediate fix?
First, remove existing remote monitoring connections (cellular or satellite) from ZPMC cranes unless they are explicitly authorized, justified, and securely governed. This should be validated with trusted a trusted and verified third party.
Second, prohibit future unauthorized modifications or access by instituting regular independent assessments by a trusted third party, with specific attention to hidden communications equipment that can bypass security controls.
Third, establish an active monitoring program to detect cyberattacks and attempts to reestablish remote control, with regular reporting to a governing body, and the authority and readiness to act when necessary.
What is the medium-term fix?
The medium-term path is modernization without unnecessary scrappage. In many cases, the core risk is not the crane’s steel structure, but the “intelligent” technology operating it. That creates an opportunity to retrofit: replace or isolate control technology using U.S.-based or allied solutions.
In parallel, ports should implement baseline OT cybersecurity controls: logical segmentation, secure network protocols, current and fully patched operating systems, strong passwords, and properly managed privileged accounts. Routine security posture assessments should identify deviations before they become systemic vulnerabilities.
Ports should also conduct architectural assessments to identify unauthorized equipment (such as cellular modems) and perform risk assessments that map what data the crane could access—and what may have been exfiltrated—so leaders can understand exposure and prioritize remediation.
Finally, if remote access is required for support, ports must have full visibility into vendor actions during support sessions, including robust access control and logging that the port operator, not the vendor, controls.
What is the long-term fix?
A durable solution requires governance and policy reform. The U.S. should develop legislation and regulation to reduce or prohibit foreign ownership of ports and foreign ownership or operation of critical port technologies, unless sourced from trusted allies under enforceable security standards.
An empowered oversight committee should be established to drive compliance, compel remediation, and ensure regular monitoring and reporting. Contracts should be scrutinized and strengthened, with severe penalties for non-compliance and clear security provisions that include audit rights and restrictions on modifications and access.
Lastly, resilience requires investment: increased federal funding and support to help ports transition away from risky dependencies, adopt trusted technologies, and sustain third-party security validation and monitoring at scale.
